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Abstract
This paper presents evidence that, in Europe, production of high-tech goods is
attracted to large markets, while R&D activities tend to be located away from them.
In order to explain this phenomenon, we develop a two-country general equilibrium
model where ﬁrms make separate choices about the location of R&D and high-
tech production. There are two agglomeration forces: R&D spillovers and a home-
market eﬀect creating incentives for ﬁrms to locate production in the relatively large
market. We show that, for relatively weak R&D spillovers and intermediate trade
costs, the smaller economy tends to specialize in R&D. We also discuss the welfare
consequences of diﬀerent outcomes with respect to the location of R&D, showing
that while skilled labor may gain from hosting an agglomeration of R&D activities,
unskilled labor will lose.
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11 Introduction
The increased globalization of the economy has generated concerns about the location of
industries, especially those where ﬁrms seem to be able to shift around production on
a global scale. For policy-makers, these concerns are primarily related to the potential
loss of jobs from a relocation of industries and its eﬀect on unemployment. However,
a sh a sb e e ne m p h a s i z e di nt h er e c e n tl i t e r a t u r eo nt r a d ea n dl o c a t i o n ,t h e r ea r ea l s o
concerns about potential welfare losses from a relocation of activities generating positive
externalities (e.g. Krugman, 1991a). In particular, the location of high-tech industries
characterized by the importance of research and development (R&D) for generating new
and improved products, may be of importance for national welfare. Since the available
empirical evidence suggests that R&D activities generate positive spillovers that are geo-
graphically limited in scope (e.g. Griliches, 1992 and Jaﬀe et al., 1993), regions that are
successful in attracting R&D activities may improve their welfare.
In most economic models, R&D is simply assumed to be located with the rest of
the ﬁrm’s activities.1 For instance, models analyzing industry location in an endogenous
growth setting allow for R&D spillovers, that may be either localized or global, but assume
that ﬁrms’ private knowledge capital is internationally immobile; that is, it is assumed
that the ﬁrm generating new technology by investing in R&D has to exploit the new
technology in the country in which it is developed (see Martin and Ottaviano, 1999, and
Baldwin et al., 2001). An implication of this would be that R&D investing ﬁrms carry out
R&D-intensive production in the same country. In this paper, we will argue that while
this is a fair description of the location pattern of the activities of many R&D-investing
ﬁrms, there are important deviations from this pattern. In particular, if there are low
costs involved in transferring technology within ﬁrms, we would expect that multinational
ﬁrms may end up carrying out production activities in other countries than where their
R&D facilities are located. The reason for this is that a country which is an attractive
location for R&D activities is not necessarily an attractive location for production of
R & D - i n t e n s i v eg o o d s . Ac o u n t r yw i t hal a r g em a r k e tp o t e n t i a lm a yb ec o n s i d e r e da n
attractive location for the production of ﬁnal products, while this is unlikely to be an
important aspect when deciding on the location of R&D activities.
In Europe, in particular, there is a tendency that small, peripheral countries, such as
1Notable exceptions in this respect are papers analyzing vertically integrated multinational ﬁrms,
meaning ﬁrms locating diﬀerent stages of their production process in diﬀerent countries (see Helpman,
1984, Markusen, 1997, 2002).
2Sweden and Finland, are home countries of highly R&D-intensive multinationals, which
carry out production in other locations. This phenomenon is at odds with the standard
assumption that R&D and production take place in the same country. We will present
empirical evidence suggesting that the European countries’ R&D activities exhibit a very
diﬀerent relationship with respect to the countries’ market potential compared to high-
tech production. While there is a positive relationship between a country’s market poten-
tial and its specialization in high-tech production, there is a negative relationship between
its market potential and the extent to which R&D is carried out in the country. Based
on this evidence, we argue that an appropriate analysis of the location choice of high-tech
ﬁrms should allow for a geographical separation of these activities.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model where ﬁrms may choose to locate their
R&D activities and their production plants in diﬀerent countries, and to use this model to
analyze how the location outcome depends on a number of crucial parameters. We allow
for two diﬀerent sources of agglomeration economies: knowledge spillovers associated
with R&D activities (as in the previously cited studies by Martin and Ottaviano, 1999,
and Baldwin et al., 2001) and linkages between ﬁrms carrying out production of ﬁnal
goods. The linkages, which arise from the combination of increasing returns to scale
in production and transaction costs associated with cross-border trade, create a so-called
”home-market” eﬀect, whereby a region with a relatively large market has an advantage in
attracting production of ﬁnal goods. This aspect of the model is similar to recent models
within the so-called ”new economic geography” (see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999).
Our model thus involves two diﬀerent mechanisms creating incentives for the con-
centration of activities, and, with respect to the home-market eﬀect, incentives for the
concentration of these activities in a large market. However, counteracting these two
centripetal forces is the eﬀect on the return to scarce factors when R&D activities and
the production of high-tech goods compete for resources. We assume that both these
activities use inputs of skilled labor. The outcome in terms of the ﬁrms’ location choices
then depends on the interplay between the advantages of concentrating activities in order
to beneﬁt from externalities and being close ﬁnal consumers and the disadvantages of
locating skill-intensive activities where skilled labor is relatively expensive.
I nt h ep a p e r ,w ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ei sa na s y m m e t r yb e t w e e nc o u n t r i e si n
terms of their sizes. We analyze how the location choices of high-tech ﬁrms are aﬀected
by the strength of externalities generated by R&D activities and the strength of a home-
market eﬀect generated by the combination of plant-level scale economies and trade costs.
3The analysis is related to work by Markusen (1997, 2002), which shows that a small
country may end up headquartering vertically integrated multinationals with production
in the larger country when the smaller country is relatively skill-abundant and trade costs
relatively low. A crucial diﬀerence between this analysis and that by Markusen, however,
is that agglomeration economies may not only aﬀect the location of production activities,
but also that of non-production activities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we ﬁrst present empirical
evidence motivating our analysis. In section 3, we discuss the related literature and the
contribution of the analysis. Section 4 presents and discusses the model, while section 5
analyzes the location choice by high-tech ﬁrms on diﬀerent assumptions about the strength
of the diﬀerent sources of agglomeration economies. It also examines the consequences
for welfare. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Market Size and High-Tech Activities
Figure 1 shows a plot diagram of business expenditures on R&D per capita, and the share
of high-tech goods in total manufacturing exports for OECD countries. As predicted
by standard theory, there is a positive correlation between these two variables (the solid
line shows the ﬁtted line from an OLS regression). However, there are some interesting
outliers. For instance, Sweden, which is the country that after Japan has the highest
R&D expenditures per capita, does not belong to the countries with the highest share of
high-tech goods in their exports. On the opposite side, Ireland has the highest share of
high-tech goods in their exports, but does not belong to the countries with the highest
ratio between R&D expenditures and GDP. A common feature of these two economies is
the important role of multinational enterprises (MNEs); Sweden being the home country
of several large MNEs and Ireland being the host country of many MNEs originating in
the US and Japan, as well as other European countries.
{Figure 1: R&D expenditures per capita and the share of high-tech exports in total
manufacturing exports (2000).}
An immediately obvious potential explanation for these two outliers is that they reﬂect
t h et e n d e n c yo fM N E st oc o n c e n t r a t et h e i rR & Da c t i v i t i e si nt h ep a r e n tﬁrm in their home
4countries while producing R&D intensive goods closer to large markets.2 This tendency
is often taken to be the main explanation why certain small countries, such as Sweden,
with large R&D expenditures in relation to GDP do not export high-tech goods to the
extent motivated by their R&D expenditures.
In order to examine the relationship between market size, on the one hand, and high-
tech production and R&D activities, on the other, we carry out a regression analysis
based on data for the Western European countries. Production of high-tech goods and
R&D spending are likely to be jointly determined by variables such as relative factor
endowments and market potential. However, since costs associated with transferring
technology may lead to a tendency for co-location of high-tech production and R&D
activities, their separate eﬀect on one another should be controlled for. We therefore
control for the extent of R&D activities in our regression of a measure of a country’s
specialization in high-tech production, and we control for the specialization in high-tech
production in our regression of a measure of the extent of R&D activities.
We run the following regressions: A country’s share of high-tech exports in total
manufacturing exports (HTexp) is regressed on its market potential (MP), relative skill
endowment (Skill) and real business expenditures on R&D per capita (R&D). A coun-
try’s real business expenditure on R&D per capita is regressed on its market potential,
relative skill endowment, and its share of high-tech exports in total manufacturing ex-
ports. Our measure of market potential takes the form developed by Harris (1954) and is
based on data on real gross domestic income.3 Relative skill endowments, are measured
as the share of population with tertiary education.4 Data on high-tech exports in total
manufacturing exports have been collected from the World Bank (2003),5 while data on
2This explanation for the case of Sweden is discussed in Hansson and Lundberg (1995).




where xj is measure of the market size of country j and dij a measure of the geographical distance
between i and j.W eh a v em e a s u r e dxj dij as the greater circle distance between capitals when j 6= i and
as two thirds of the ratio of i’s area and π when j = i. (The data have been collected from Penn World
Tables 6.)
4Data have been collected from OECD’s publication Education at a Glance: OECD indicators (various
issues). The share of population 25 to 64 years of age that has attained university education (tertiary
type A).
5High-technology goods are goods produced by industries (based on U.S. industries) that rank in the
t o p1 0a c c o r d i n gt oR & De x p e n d i t u r e s .M a n u f a c t u r e d exports are the commodities in the SITC, revision
1, sections 5-9 (chemicals and related products, basic manufactures, manufactured articles, machinery
and transport equipment, and other manufactured articles and goods not elsewhere classiﬁed), excluding
5business expenditures on R&D per capita have been collected from OECD (2003).6 Our
data cover the period 1990-2000 and include most countries in the European Union, Nor-
way and Switzerland.7 Due to the co-location of high-tech production and R&D activities,
and the endogeneity problem it may cause, we also instrument high-tech exports in total
manufacturing exports (HTexp) and business expenditures on R&D per capita (R&D)
as they are regressed on one another. As instruments for R&D we use the number of
researchers in higher education as a share of the population (RHE),8 R&D expenditures
in higher education as a share of GDP (HERD)a n dG D Pp e rc a p i t a( GDPcap)a n da s
an instrument for HTexp we use trade as a share of GDP.9 The chosen variables fulﬁll
the desired properties of instrument variables (for a correlation table, see Appendix B).
Table 1 presents the results obtained from carrying out ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation and
2SLS within estimation. We analyze the results for the 2SLS within estimations. As ex-
pected, there is a strong and positive relationship between a country’s R&D expenditures
and high-tech exports; the elasticity of high-tech exports with respect to R&D expendi-
tures is 0.44 and the elasticity of R&D expenditures with respect to high-tech exports is
1.36. Conditional on the level of high-tech exports, relative endowments of skilled labor
have a positive eﬀect on the share of high-tech exports. The estimated eﬀect of relative
endowments of skilled labor on R&D expenditure per capita, on the other hand, is neg-
ative (although insigniﬁcant). This suggests that R&D activities may be dependent on
i n p u t so fm o r es p e c i ﬁc skills than those measured by our skill variable.
The important result emerging from the analysis is, however, that the estimated co-
eﬃcients of market potential have diﬀerent signs in the two regressions. The eﬀect of
market potential is positive on high-tech exports, but negative on R&D expenditure. The
estimated coeﬃcients are both statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. The point
estimates translate into relatively large elasticities with respect to market potential, with
a positive elasticity of 3.76 for the share of high-tech exports and a negative elasticity of
-3.90 for R&D expenditure per capita.10
division 68 (nonferrous metals).
6T h es e r i e sh a v eb e e nd e ﬂated using the GDP deﬂator.
7The estimations make use of data for 11 years and 16 countries (Austria and Luxemburg are excluded
because of lack of data). Observations for several of the variables are only available for certain years,
implying that the panel is unbalanced.
8Measured as full-time equivalent researchers per 1000 population.
9Data on the researchers and R&D expenditures in higher education have been collected from OECD’s
Main Science and Technology Indicators, while data on trade as a share of GDP have been collected from
World Development Indicators (World Bank). Data on GDP per capita are from SourceOECD.
10We have run regressions using measures of market potential based on real GDP and real consumption
6The ﬁndings suggests that market potential in itself has a diﬀerential impact on the
location of high-tech production and R&D activities in Europe. In ceteris paribus terms,
increased market potential attracts high-tech production, while it deters R&D activities.
That production activities in the high-tech sector are attracted by market potential is
consistent with predictions from trade and location models, assuming that high-tech pro-
duction is characterized by increasing returns to scale and trade costs. The negative
impact of market potential on R&D activities, however, is not so easy to interpret on
the basis of existing theory. We posit in this paper that it is negative because R&D gets
crowded out as activities for which market access is more important move in. In the pres-
ence of advantages from being located in proximity to other R&D labs, this crowding-out
eﬀect may be especially strong.
3 Related Literature
In an early paper, Krugman (1980) showed that the combination of increasing returns to
scale and transaction costs associated with cross-border trade may generate a so-called
home-market eﬀect; a tendency for large countries to host a disproportionately large
share of production. The presence of scale economies generates an incentive for ﬁrms
to concentrate production in one single location and, by locating production in a large
market, ﬁrms get better access to consumers. This home-market eﬀect serves as the basis
for more recent theorizing within the so-called new economic geography framework (see
Fujita et al., 1999, Baldwin et al., 2003).
In related work, multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been incorporated in trade-
theoretic models by adding the assumption that there exist joint inputs such as manage-
ment, marketing and R&D, which create multi-plant economies of scale (e.g. Markusen
1984, Horstmann and Markusen, 1992, Brainard 1993, Markusen and Venables, 2000). In
these models, the location choices of MNEs crucially depend on the trade-oﬀ between the
beneﬁts from concentrating production in one location and those stemming from locating
in proximity to the consumers, thereby avoiding trade costs. The MNEs arising in these
models can be characterized as horizontal in the sense of producing the same ﬁnal good
as well. Using these two measures leads to essentially the same results and elasticities of the same
magnitude as those presented in Table 1. We have also run regressions with GDP replacing the market
potential variable. The estimated elasticity of HTexp with respect to GDP is 1.37 (signiﬁcant at the
ten percent level) and the estimated elasticity of R&D with respect to GDP -1.63 (signiﬁcant at the one
percent level).
7in more than one country. However, MNEs may also be vertical in the sense of carrying
out diﬀerent stages of the production process in diﬀerent countries. Vertical MNEs have
been analyzed by Helpman (1984) using a trade model with monopolistic competition,
but without any trade costs. In Helpman’s analysis, a skilled-labor abundant country
may end up being net exporter of headquarters services because skill-intensive headquar-
ters activities tend to be located there, while less skill-intensive production takes place
elsewhere.
More recently, Markusen (1997, 2002) has developed a model incorporating horizon-
tal as well as vertical MNEs. As in the analysis by Helpman (1984), vertical MNEs
arise when there are advantages in fragmenting the production process into skill-intensive
headquarters activities and less skill-intensive production of the ﬁnal good. However,
in Markusen’s analysis, the equilibrium production structure is not only determined by
diﬀerences in factor proportions but also by the level of trade costs. This is important
since it may be especially advantageous to locate ﬁn a l - g o o d sp r o d u c t i o ni nal a r g em a r k e t
when trade costs create beneﬁts from producing in proximity to the consumer.
Ekholm and Forslid (2001) show in a one-factor model how vertically integrated MNEs
may arise as ﬁnal goods production is agglomerated in a large market while headquarters
activities remain where labor costs are relatively low. A similar idea has been pursued by
Gao (1999), who also analyzed a model of vertical MNEs in which agglomeration forces
create a factor-cost reason for ﬁrms to locate part of their activities in the periphery, where
wages are lower. In Gao’s analysis, labor is the only factor input, while both headquarters
activities and ﬁnal production require diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs that are traded
at a cost. Because headquarter activities are assumed to be more intensive in intermediate
inputs, agglomeration forces are stronger for headquarters compared to ﬁnal production.
This implies that it is the headquarters activities that end up being located in the core,
while ﬁnal goods production takes place in the periphery.
Neither of these papers allow for the possibility that headquarters activities gener-
ate externalities. In the presence of such externalities, e.g. knowledge spillovers from
R&D activities, the location of headquarters might be important from a welfare point of
view. Knowledge spillovers may arise because ﬁrms learn from each other, for example
through cooperation, by reverse-engineering each others’ products or as a consequence
of the turnover of highly specialized labor. Several studies have found evidence of such
knowledge spillovers (e.g. Jaﬀe et al., 1993, Acs et al., 1992, 1994, Feldman, 1994, and
Audretsch and Feldman, 1996).
8A few papers have analyzed industrial location in the presence of knowledge spillovers,
but without allowing for the emergence of vertical MNEs. These papers build on the
endogenous growth literature (Martin and Ottaviano, 1999, Baldwin et al., 2001) and
assume that technological spillovers may diﬀuse either globally and locally. With global
spillovers, the part of knowledge capital that is not private to ﬁr m si sp e r f e c t l yt r a n s m i t t e d
to ﬁrms in other regions. With purely local spillovers, it is transmitted only to ﬁrms
located in the same region. When spillovers fade away with distance, they generate a
localized externality, which creates an additional agglomeration force. As mentioned in
the introduction, ﬁrms’ private knowledge capital is assumed to be completely immobile
between regions in these models.
In our model, we assume localized knowledge spillovers generated by R&D activities.
If they were global in scope, there would be no particular beneﬁts from local R&D ac-
tivities. In fact, if technological knowledge very easily diﬀused across countries, it may
even be beneﬁcial to free-ride on the rest of the world by cutting back investments in
R&D. However, the fact that R&D activities tend to be geographically concentrated sug-
gests that the knowledge spillovers may be geographically limited in scope. For instance,
Feldman and Audretsch (1996) ﬁnd that, controlling for the degree of geographical con-
centration of production, innovative activity tends to cluster more in industries where
knowledge spillovers play a decisive role. Moreover, Jaﬀe et al. (1993) provide direct
evidence of geographically limited knowledge spillovers from R&D activities.11
Our model adds knowledge spillovers associated with R&D activities to an analysis of
t h el o c a t i o nc h o i c eo fﬁrms, which are potentially vertical MNEs in the sense of being able
to geographically separate their R&D activities from their production of ﬁnal goods. The
analysis contributes to the previous literature by allowing for both knowledge spillovers
and a geographical separation of the ﬁrm’s activities. Knowledge spillovers may interact
with agglomeration forces based on a home-market eﬀect in a mutually reinforcing way.
However, at the same time, if ﬁnal production and R&D activities draw on the same type
of resources, as is reasonable to expect when it comes to high-tech production, it may
also be the case that the concentration of one type of activity raises the prices of these
resources so much that the other type of activity will be located elsewhere.12 It is the
11See also work by Jacobs (1969), Ciccione and Hall (1996), Coe and Helpman (1995), Coe et al. (1997)
and Keller (2002).
12A somewhat related analysis can be found in Ekholm and Torstensson (1997), where the possibility
of expanding high-tech production by means of production and R&D subsidies is analyzed assuming that
both R&D and the production of high-tech goods require inputs of skilled labor.
9interaction between these forces that is the focus of the present analysis.
B e c a u s ew ea l l o wﬁrms to choose to locate their R&D activities in proximity to other
R&D labs in order to beneﬁt from knowledge spillovers, the analysis is related to the
literature on technology sourcing and so-called ”centres of excellence”. It has been ar-
gued that MNEs locate R&D in ”centres of excellence” in order to source the available
technology (Kogut and Chang, 1991, Neven and Siotis, 1996). Our analysis shows under
what circumstances such technology sourcing emerges and under what circumstances it
takes place in a small rather than in a large country. Moreover it addresses the issue
whether hosting a "centre of excellence" is likely to improve national welfare.
4T h e M o d e l
We assume a two-country, two-factor and two-good model to analyze the location choice
by ﬁrms operating in a high-tech industry. There are two countries, Home (H)a n d
Foreign (F), two factors of production, skilled labor (S) and unskilled labor (L), and
two ﬁnal goods, a homogeneous good, Y , produced with constant returns to scale in
a perfectly competitive sector and a diﬀerentiated high-tech good, X,p r o d u c e dw i t h
economies of scale and sold in markets characterized by monopolistic competition. The
supply of skilled and unskilled labor is given. Both factors of production are perfectly
mobile between sectors but completely immobile between countries. The technology for
producing the homogeneous good, Y , is linear and one unit of L produces one unit of Y .
Production of X requires inputs of technological knowledge (R). It is assumed that ﬁrms
internalize the creation of private knowledge capital and exploit it themselves rather
than selling or leasing it to other ﬁrms.13 The ﬁrm-speciﬁc technological knowledge is
created by R&D labs that may be located in a diﬀerent country than production. Firms
choosing to produce R and X in the same country become national enterprises, while
ﬁrms choosing to separate R&D from production become multinational enterprises with a
vertical production structure. We use n to superscript variables associated with national
ﬁrms and m to superscript variables associated with multinational ﬁrms.
13The motivation for this assumption is that information asymmetries create problems with adverse
selection.
104.1 Technology
R&D labs produce an input transferrable across national borders but not tradable in
the sense that it can be sold at arm’s length to any ﬁrm. R is assumed to be directly
supplied to the production plant within the same ﬁrm. A motivation for this assumption
is that asymmetric information and incomplete contracting may create strong incentives
to internalize R&D within the ﬁrm. However, at the same time, we assume the ﬁrms to be
unable to completely internalize the beneﬁts from their R&D. We assume the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge produced by individual ﬁrms to spill over to all ﬁrms conducting R&D in the
same country. More speciﬁcally, we assume the cost of inventing additional varieties in
terms of inputs of skilled labor to decrease with the amount of R&D conducted in the
country. The production function of a representative R&D lab is speciﬁed as follows:
Rij =
1






,g = n,m, (1)
where Rij is the amount of R&D produced by ﬁrm i in country j,t h es u mRj is aggregate
R & Dc o n d u c t e di nc o u n t r yj,a n dSRij the amount of skilled labor employed by ﬁrm
i to carry out R&D in country j.P a r a m e t e r ρg ≥ 1 denotes a cost for geographically
separating the production of R and X.14 We assume that ρn =1and ρm > 1,w h i c h
implies that there is no additional cost incurred by national ﬁrms, only by multinational
ﬁrms. An intuitive interpretation of ρ is that it reﬂects the costs of transmitting knowledge
capital from R&D labs to production facilities abroad. With a high value of ρm, there will
be no multinational ﬁrms.15 With a value of ρm equal to one, the type of ﬁrm does not
matter and we cannot distinguish a situation in which there is one national ﬁrm operating
in each country from the situation in which there is one vertical MNE carrying out R&D
i nH o m ea n dp r o d u c t i o ni nF o r e i g na n da n o t h e rM N Ec a r r y i n go u tR & Di nF o r e i g na n d
production in Home. Such a case could be analyzed assuming a setting were R&D results
are sold in a market, focusing entirely on outcomes in terms of specialization patterns,
leaving issues about the conﬁguration of ﬁrms to the side. In our model, however, the
conﬁguration of ﬁrms is an important aspect. It is therefore assumed that ρm ∈ (1,ρ),
where ρ is the level at which the cost of transferring technological knowledge becomes
14Our speciﬁcation in (1) implies that transferring R from one country to another involves an ”iceberg”
type of cost so that ρg ≥ 1 units must be shipped from the R&D lab for one unit of R to arrive at the
production plant located abroad.
15This would correspond to the case analyzed by Martin and Ottaviano (1999) and Baldwin et al.
(2001).
11prohibitively high and prevents the existence of multinational ﬁrms.
The production function speciﬁed in (1) has the property of augmenting the produc-
tivity of skilled labor in a constant proportion to the number of ﬁrms conducting R&D
i nt h ec o u n t r y . W eh a v et h u sa s s u m e dt h a tt he R&D spillovers obtained from an addi-
tional ﬁrm conducting R&D in the country is independent of the initial size of the R&D
sector. Alternative assumptions could be made, i.e., increasing or decreasing productivity
spillovers in the R&D sector. However, since we have no information about the speciﬁc
nature of R&D spillovers, we have simply chosen to model them as being constant.
A cost-minimizing ﬁrm chooses SRi, taking the level of R as given, in order to produce
the technological knowledge required to produce a variety of the high-tech product. That
is, we assume that the ﬁrm takes potential knowledge spillovers into account in its location
decision. For a ﬁrm to enter the market with a new variety, it must generate one unit
of R. This implies the following demand for skilled labor stemming from an R&D lab


















j is the number of national enterprises in country j and nm
k the number of multi-
national enterprises conducting R&D in country j and producing in country k (note that
country subscripts denote the country where the ﬁrm locates its production plant). A
ﬁrm deciding to conduct its R&D in the country with a larger total number of R&D labs
needs to use a smaller amount of skilled labor in order to produce its own single unit of
R.
The high-tech ﬁrms then employ unskilled labor (L) and skilled labor (S)t op r o d u c e
their ﬁnal products. There are ﬁxed costs in production, creating an incentive for concen-
trating ﬁnal production to one country. More speciﬁcally, we assume the following cost
function of a representative high-tech ﬁrm producing in region j:




Lj (β + γXij) (3)
where wSj and wLj are the returns to skilled and unskilled labor, respectively, Xij is the
level of output of the representative ﬁrm i, α ∈ [0,1],a n dβ and γ are positive constants.
124.2 Preferences
In modelling consumer preferences, we use the Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation of preferences














where CX is a sub-utility function capturing utility derived from the consumption of
diﬀerent varieties of high-tech goods; ci denotes the consumption of each available variety,
µ ∈ [0,1],a n dnw = nn + nm is the total number of varieties produced.16
It is well-known that a two-stage budgeting procedure generates the following expres-













is a CES price index of manufacturing products and E total
expenditures.
Letting Y be numeraire, we get the following demand for Y :
CY =( 1− µ)E. (6)
4.3 Proﬁt Maximization of Firms

















,j= H,F, k = H,F, j 6= k, g = n,m (7)
where n
g
j is the number of high-tech producing ﬁrms in country j (superscript g denotes
national or multinational). Trade in X is assumed to involve an iceberg type of transaction
16Following e.g. Neary (2001), we assume a ﬁnite number of varieties instead of deﬁning the subutility
function CX over a continuum of varieties. This requires a suﬃciently large number of ﬁrms for us to be
able to approximate the elasticity of demand by σ (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985, Chapter 6).
13cost denoted by τ ≥ 1 (for one unit to arrive, τ units must be shipped).













where σ is the price elasticity of demand. Free entry and exit and a continuous number of
ﬁrms imply that in equilibrium, all active ﬁr m sm a k ez e r op r o ﬁts. At the same time, these
assumptions imply that a type of ﬁrm that is not active in equilibrium, must make negative
proﬁts. This means that we have the following complementary slackness condition:
Π
g
j ≤ 0 n
g




j =0 . (9)
Given the pricing condition (8), the proﬁts of a national enterprise in country j are:
Π
n








Lj β − wSj
¡






where the ﬁrst subscript of Xjj denotes the location of the production plant and the
second the market where the ﬁnal good is sold. The second term in (10) represents the
ﬁxed costs in production and the third term the cost of producing one unit of R.P r o ﬁts












Lj β − wSkρ
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The equilibrium conditions used to solve the model are ﬁrst-order conditions, zero proﬁt
conditions (in complementary slackness form) and conditions for the clearing of factor and
goods markets. To solve for the equilibrium, we use the following system of equations for




























































































































(γ (Xjj + τXjk)+β) (wSj)
wLj ≥ 1. (Yj)
The associated variables are given in parenthesis after each equilibrium condition. In





F , pH, pF, EH, EF, wSH, wSF, wLH, wLF, XHH, XHF, XFF, XFH, YH,a n dYF.
5A n a l y s i s
In this model, the combination of increasing returns to scale and trade costs creates
ah o m e -market eﬀect leading to a tendency for the larger country to attract the ﬁnal
production of the diﬀerentiated good. As in new economic-geography models with inter-
15sectorally mobile, but regionally immobile, factors, the advantages of locating increasing
returns to scale production in the larger market are strongest for intermediate levels of
trade costs.17
Because of the tendency for the ﬁnal goods production of X to become concentrated
in the large country, the small country may end up having an advantage in producing
R&D. That is, it may be cheaper to produce R&D in the small country because skilled
labor is relatively expensive in the large country where most of the skill-intensive high-tech
p r o d u c t i o nt a k e sp l a c e .H o w e v e r ,i tm a ys t i l lb et h ec a s et h a tR & Db e c o m e sc o n c e n t r a t e d
in the large country, since there are agglomeration economies working in the R&D sector
as well.
5.1 Stability of Diﬀerent Equilibria
To begin with, note that in equilibrium, there will never be multinational ﬁrms originating
in both countries. If there are incentives for ﬁrms producing in country j to conduct R&D
in country k, there cannot simultaneously be incentives for ﬁrms producing in country k
to conduct R&D in country j.18
Suppose we start from a situation with only national ﬁrms. A ﬁrm producing in H
(F) has no incentive to relocate its R&D activities to F (H) if the cost of separating
R&D from production geographically is greater than a potential lowering of costs for
R&D by locating these activities in the other country. Using the expressions for the costs
of carrying out R&D activities given by the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n s ,w eﬁnd that this is the





(1 − δ + δnn
F)




17See e.g. Krugman and Venables (1995), and Venables (1996).





where ϕ ≡ (1 − δ + δ(nn
H + nm
F ))/(1 − δ + δ(nn
F + nm
H)).I fﬁrms producing in F have incentives to locate






Since 1/ρm <ρ m, both conditions cannot hold simultaneously.
16If this condition is satisﬁed, an equilibrium with only national ﬁr m si ss t a b l ew i t hr e s p e c t
to the potential relocation of activities.
There are three factors aﬀecting whether (11) holds: the relative return to skilled labor
in the two countries, the relative number of ﬁrms, the strength of R&D externalities as
captured by δ, and the size of the separation cost, ρm. If follows directly from (11) that
the higher the return to skilled labor in H relative to F and the larger the number of
ﬁrms in F relative to H, the less likely that ﬁrms from F have incentive to relocate R&D
to H, but the more likely that ﬁrms from H have incentive to relocate R&D to F.A s
long as nn
F >n n
H,ah i g h e rv a l u eo fδ will have an eﬀect in the same direction (i.e. making
it less likely that ﬁrms have incentive to relocate R&D to H, but more likely that they
have incentive to relocate R&D to F). An increase in the value of ρm will expand the
parameter space for which an equilibrium with only national ﬁr m si ss t a b l e .I no r d e rf o r
multinational ﬁrms to arise for some parameter values, ρm cannot be too high.
Suppose that we start from a situation with R&D concentrated in F. In this case there
are national ﬁrms from F and multinational ﬁrms carrying out R&D in F and production
in H. This will constitute a stable equilibrium if a multinational ﬁrm has no incentive to
relocate R&D to H. Once more, we use the expressions for the cost of carrying out R&D










Similarly, if we start from a situation with R&D concentrated in H; implying that there
are national ﬁrms in H and multinational ﬁrms carrying out R&D in H and production
in F; this will be a stable equilibrium if a multinational ﬁrm has no incentive to relocate










With only national ﬁrms operating, the diﬀerence in country size will, through its
eﬀect on the relative size of the R&D sector, always be a factor pulling R&D labs in the
direction of the larger country. However, since the presence of a home-market eﬀect should
put upward pressure on the return to skilled labor in the larger country, there may also be
a counteracting force stemming from diﬀerences in factor prices, pulling R&D labs in the
direction of the smaller country. Whether this force is suﬃciently strong to outweigh the
17one related to a diﬀerence in the size of the R&D sector depends on the strength of the
home market eﬀect, which in turn depends on the level of trade costs. In the following, we
shall analyze how the relative return to skilled labor in the small country varies with the
level of trade costs. This analysis is done in order to bring out under what circumstances
the net eﬀect of the two opposing forces might be such that R&D labs are pulled in the
direction of the small country.
Assume that both countries produce Y so that wLH = wLF =1and that there are
only national ﬁrms operating in the high-tech sector. Using the zero-proﬁt condition for











where ξH ≡ (1 − δ + δnn
H)
−1.19
This condition gives us the combinations of nn
H and wSH for which the demand for
skilled labor equals the ﬁxed supply. The resulting relationship between nn
H and wSH is
positive (see Appendix). It is shown in Figure 2 as the upward sloping broken curve.20.
The curve is upward sloping since a larger number of high-tech ﬁr m sl e a d st oal a r g e r
demand for skilled labor and therefore a higher return to skilled labor. The level of δ
aﬀects the location of this curve so that a higher level of δ shifts the curve to right (i.e.
reduces the demand for skilled labor for a given number of ﬁrms).
{Figure 2: Stability of equilibrium with national ﬁrms only}
In order to ﬁnd the equilibrium value of nn
H and wSH, we need to ensure that goods
markets clear as well. Combining the zero-proﬁt condition with supply equals demand for
a representative national ﬁrm producing high-tech goods in Home gives us the following
19See the Appendix for the derivation of the condition.
20The following parameter values have been used to plot the curve: SH =2 0 ,δ=0 .05,α=0 .5,
































This condition gives us the combinations of nn
H and wSH for which supply equals demand
f o rag i v e nn u m b e ro fﬁrms and return to skilled workers in Foreign. Because of the
complexity of this condition, we are unable to ﬁnd closed-form solutions for nn
H and wSH,
which is why we present numerical simulations in the next section.
The relationship between nn
H and wSH implicit in condition (15) may very well be a
non-monotonic one (see Appendix), indicating the possibility of multiple equilibria. The
ambiguity of the relationship arises for the following reason: An increase in nn
H has two
eﬀects; a decrease in R&D costs, which implies that output per ﬁrm has to decrease
in order to maintain zero proﬁts, and a decrease in the demand for each product. It
is possible that these two eﬀects exactly net out so that market clearing is maintained
without any change in wSH.I f t h e t w o e ﬀects do not net out, however, implying that
ﬁrms are making either positive or negative proﬁts at the given level of demand, wSH
has to change in order for proﬁts to be zero when ﬁrms are selling their equilibrium
level of output. Changes in wSH aﬀect demand diﬀerently depending on whether trade
costs are high or low. An increase in wSH close to free trade will reduce the demand for
domestically produced products, since they become relatively more expensive compared
to foreign ones. An increase in wSH close to autarky, on the other hand, will increase
the demand for domestically produced products, since it leads to an increase in income
and there is only weak competition for foreign produced varieties. Whether an increase
or a decrease in wSH is required to maintain equilibrium in the goods market therefore
depends on the level of trade costs.
It is important to note that the relationship between nn
H and wSH implicit in condition
(15) depends on the level of trade costs. In Figure 2, there are three curves plotting this
condition: one for free trade (τ =1 .0), one for an intermediate level of trade costs
(τ =1 .25) and one for a high level of trade costs (τ =2 .0).22 The curvature changes from
21See the Appendix for the derivation of the condition.
22The following values of the additional parameters have been used: δ =0 .01,α=0 .5,β=0 .1,
19an essentially horizontal line at free trade to more and more negatively sloped curves
for higher trade costs. However, more importantly, the location of the curves diﬀers
depending on the level of τ. When the home-market eﬀe c ti ss t r o n g ,i . e .t h et r a d ec o s ti s
at an intermediate level, the return to skilled labor consistent with goods market clearing
is lower for a given number of ﬁrms compared to when it is weak, i.e. the trade cost is
either low or high.
The implied equilibrium values of nn
H and wSH are such that for low and high levels of
trade costs, the equilibrium price of skilled workers and the number of ﬁr m si sh i g h e rt h a n
for an intermediate level of the trade cost. A low wSH creates an advantage for Home in
carrying out R&D activities that has to be weighed against the disadvantage of having
relatively small R&D externalities.
In Figure 2, we have also drawn two thin lines showing the combinations of nn
H and
wSH that make ﬁrms indiﬀerent between being national and multinational ﬁrms for a
given value of the cost for separating R&D and production; here taken to be relatively




wSH (1 − δ + δnn
F)
wSF (1 − δ + δnn
H)
. (16)
Above this line, high-tech ﬁrms operating in Foreign have no incentive to relocate R&D
activities, whereas below the line they have incentive to relocate R&D to Home.




wSH (1 − δ + δnn
F)
wSF (1 − δ + δnn
H)
. (17)
Below this line, ﬁrms producing in Home have no incentive to relocate R&D activities,
whereas above the line they have incentive to relocate R&D to Foreign. The value of ρm
has been set suﬃciently low for an equilibrium with only national ﬁr m st ob eu n s t a b l ef o r
all three levels of τ. However, whereas ﬁr m si nH o m eh a v ei n c e n t i v e st or e l o c a t eR & Dt o
Foreign for low and high levels of trade costs, it is the ﬁrms in Foreign that have incentive
to relocate R&D to Home for intermediate levels of trade costs. That is, when the home-
µ =0 .7,σ=7 .5, γ =1 ,S H =2 0 ,L H =2 0 ,S F =4 0 ,L F =4 0 ,n n
F =9 .09,a n dwSF =0 .645.T h ev a l u e s
of nn
F and wSF have been chosen so as to be consistent with a free trade equilibrium.
23The lines are drawn for ρm =1 .015.
20market eﬀect is strong, there will be a tendency for ﬁrms to concentrate R&D activities
in the small country.
With a higher level of ρm,t h eﬁrms would lack incentive to relocate R&D activities
for a wider range of values of wSH, implying that for a suﬃciently high cost of separating
R&D and production, an equilibrium with only national ﬁrms would be stable irrespective
of trade costs. However, the case shown in Figure 2 tells us that for small separation costs,
we may get very diﬀerent location outcomes depending on the level of trade costs.
5.2 Numerical Simulations
The previous section showed that, for given production costs and number of ﬁrms in
Foreign, Home may end up specializing in R&D activities for a certain range of trade
costs. Whereas the analysis shows the possibility of such an outcome, however, it does
not establish that an equilibrium with Home specializing in R&D activities will occur
when wages and number of ﬁrms in Foreign are allowed to be determined endogenously.
In order to solve the full model, we rely on numerical simulations.24 The values of crucial
parameters have been chosen so that they are consistent with the previous empirical and
theoretical literature.25 The parameter ρm may be interpreted as the cost of transmitting
technological knowledge within an MNE. The empirical literature on such costs is scarce.
Teece (1977) is among the very few that provide empirical estimates on the costs of
transferring technology within MNEs. He found transfer costs averaging 19 percent of
the total project costs, with a considerable variation ranging from 2 to 59 percent.26 We
set ρm =1 .1, implying that separating production from R&D increases the costs involved
in creating ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge with 10 percent. This number is somewhat arbitrarily
chosen, but for the purpose of our analysis, the important aspect is that it is not so high
that ﬁrms never have incentives to become MNEs, at the same time as it is greater than
one, the point at which the model becomes degenerate with respect to determining ﬁrm
conﬁguration.
We are mainly interested in examining how the R&D externalities and the home-
market eﬀect interact in determining the outcome. The strength of the home-market
eﬀect depends on four diﬀerent parameters: the trade cost, τ, the share of high-tech goods
24We use GAMS (general algebraic modeling system) (Rutherford 1995, 1999) to solve the model.
25In the simulations discussed below we have used the following parameter values: µ =0 .7,α=0 .5,
β =0 .1,γ=1 ,σ=7 .5,S H =2 0 ,L H =2 0 ,S F =8 0and LF =8 0 .
26The sample consisted of 26 projects in the manufacturing sector.
21in consumption, µ, the elasticity of substitution, σ,a n dt h er e l a t i v es i z eo fc o u n t r i e s ,
SF/SH.27 Holding any three of these constant, variations in the fourth will aﬀect the
strength of the home-market eﬀect. It has previously been shown that the higher the
value of µ and the lower the value of σ, the greater the advantages of locating in a large
region (see Krugman, 1991b). It also seems straightforward that the larger the relative
size of Foreign, i.e. the higher the value of SF/SH (or LF/LH), the greater the advantages
of locating in that country. However, the relative size of the countries may generate more
subtle eﬀects as well; if SF/SH is very high, Home’s supply of skilled labor may be too
small for R&D to concentrate in that region.
Our strategy is to ﬁx the levels of µ, σ,a n dSF/SH, and then carry out the analysis of
the eﬀect of variations in the strength of the home-market eﬀect solely in terms of changes
in τ. An obvious reason for focusing on τ is that this parameter is the one most closely
related to changes in policy, such as eﬀorts to liberalize trade and integrate markets. The
value of µ is set to 0.7 and of σ to 7.5. The implied budget share of high-tech goods is
substantially higher than the actual share of such goods in overall consumption. However,
µ should be interpreted as the share of consumption of traded goods, which may not be
so far from 0.7. The value of σ is consistent with empirical estimations.28 For the main
part of the analysis, we will assume that Foreign is four times as large as Home, but we
will also address the issue how the outcomes depend on the relative size of countries.
The parameter δ captures the strength of R&D externalities. With weak R&D exter-
nalities, there are weak incentives for ﬁrms to concentrate R&D activities in one of the
countries. However, it makes sense to put some restrictions on how large R&D exter-
nalities can be. A natural restriction is to require that entry of an additional R&D lab
leads to a positive net eﬀect on the R&D sector’s demand for skilled labor. A suﬃcient
condition for this restriction to hold is that δ is less than the inverse of the amount of
skilled labor employed in the R&D sector (see appendix). This condition holds in all the
simulations presented.
27Note that, in this type of model, the elasticity of substitution determines the degree of scale economies,
implying that choosing a particular value of σ put restrictions on possible values of the parameters in the
cost function.
28For instance, using US data, Hanson (1998) estimated the elasticity of substitution between manu-
factured goods to range between about 5 and 11 based on a version of the Krugman model (1980).
225.2.1 Location of Production and R&D
Diﬀerent equilibria are characterized by the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms that are active, by
the pattern of specialization and the concentration of R&D activities in each of the two
countries. We ﬁrst analyze a benchmark case with no externalities in the R&D sector,
that is δ =0 . This case corresponds to one of the cases analyzed by Markusen (1997); the
case where countries of diﬀe r e n ts i z eh a v ei d e n t i c a lr e l a t i v ef a c t o re n d o w m e n t sa n dt r a d e
costs are moderately high; and one of the cases analyzed by Ekholm and Forslid (2001)
in a one-factor model with inter-regional factor mobility. Figure 3 shows Home’s share of
the total number of R&D labs and its share of total high-tech production. At free trade
and high levels of trade costs, Home’s share of total R&D and total high-tech production
is proportional to its relative size, thereby implying that there is no specialization in
either high-tech production or R&D and only national ﬁrms are active. However, at an
intermediate level of trade costs, the home-market eﬀect is relatively strong, inducing a
relatively large share of ﬁrms to locate their high-tech production in the large country (F).
This will tend to reduce demand for skilled labor in the small country (H), leading to a
relatively low price of skilled labor. The relatively low price of skilled labor creates a factor
market reason for high-tech ﬁrms to locate R&D activities in H. Hence, for intermediate
levels of trade costs, there are, in equilibrium, multinational ﬁrms producing high-tech
goods in the large country, while carrying out R&D in the small country. Within this
range of trade costs, the large country specializes in the production of high-tech goods,
while the small country specializes in R&D.29
{Figure 3: Benchmark case with no R&D externalities}
Another benchmark case is one where there are R&D externalities, but no trade costs.
In this case, the R&D externalities create incentives for ﬁr m st ol oc a t et h e i rR & Da c t i v i t i e s
in the same country. Figures 4 and 5 show that for levels of δ close to zero, both R&D
activities and production activities are spread out between the countries in proportion
to their size. However, beyond a certain threshold level of δ, R&D activities tend to
become concentrated in one of the countries. For the distribution of overall resources
assumed in Figure 4, activities agglomerate in either of the countries beyond this threshold
29With the size diﬀerences chosen in Figure 4, both countries produce the high-tech good for all levels
of τ. However, with larger size diﬀerences between Home and Foreign, high-tech production may become
completely concentrated in the large country.
23level, although we cannot determine in which. With larger size diﬀerences, however, a
concentration of R&D activities in the large country would be the only stable equilibrium
for relatively low levels of δ, since in that case, the amount of skilled labor available in
t h es m a l lc o u n t r yw o u l dn o tb es u ﬃcient to support the entire R&D sector. There is
also an unstable equilibrium where R&D activities are conducted in both countries. It
is unstable in the sense of a small perturbation of the equilibrium creating incentives for
ﬁrms of diﬀerent types to exit and enter, so that we end up in one of the equilibria with
total concentration of R&D activities.30
{Figure 4: Home’s share of R&D activities in a benchmark case with free trade}
{Figure 5: Home’s share of high-tech production in a benchmark case with free trade}
In order to analyze how R&D externalities and a home-market eﬀect interact in de-
termining the location structure, we look at cases where δ is greater than zero and τ
varies from the free trade level to close to autarky. Figure 6 shows a case where R&D
externalities are relatively weak (δ =0 .01). As seen in this Figure, at relatively low levels
of trade costs, R&D may end up being concentrated in either country. These equilibria
are stable. In addition, there is an unstable equilibrium, marked by a dashed line, where
R&D activities are spread out between the countries. For a range of intermediate trade
costs, concentration of R&D activities in the large country is not a possible equilibrium.
In this case, both concentration of R&D in the small country and dispersion of R&D are
stable equilibria. For relatively high trade costs, dispersion is the only stable equilibrium.
When trade costs are high, each country’s share of production becomes close to its share
of overall income, since ﬁrms are then mainly producing for the domestic market. This
limits the scope for concentrating R&D activities since it puts restrictions on how much
resources are available for carrying out R&D in each country. As a result, there are no
incentives for ﬁrms to separate their R&D activities from their production activities, and
all ﬁr m sb e c o m ep u r e l yn a t i o n a lo n e s .
{Figure 6: Home’s share of R&D activities for moderate R&D externalities (δ =0 .01)}
30The issue of stability has been analyzed by examining whether the total costs for conducting R&D
would increase or decrease for a ﬁrm moving its R&D activities from one country to another, keeping the
location of production ﬁxed.
24In Figures 7 and 8, we show a case with stronger R&D externalities (δ =0 .03). In
this case, R&D externalities are suﬃciently strong for making the dispersed outcome
either unfeasible, or unstable. For trade costs below a certain threshold level, R&D
becomes concentrated in either country, while for trade costs above that threshold level,
it becomes concentrated in Foreign. Figure 8 shows Home’s share of high-tech production
corresponding to the distribution of R&D activities shown in Figure 7. In the equilibrium
where R&D is concentrated in Foreign, Home’s share of high-tech production corresponds
roughly to its relative size (a little more than that close to free trade since Home will
then be net exporter of high-tech products), while in the equilibrium where R&D is
concentrated in Home, its share of high-tech production is much lower. Irrespective of
which equilibrium we end up in, there is going to be coexistence of national ﬁrms and
multinational ﬁrms carrying out their R&D activities where there is an agglomeration of
R&D; or, put diﬀerently, where there is a "center of excellence".
{Figure 7: Home’s share of R&D for stronger R&D externalities (δ =0 .03)}
{Figure 8: Home’s share of high-tech production for stronger R&D externalities (δ =
0.03)}
Ultimately, we want to trace out the location outcome for all possible values of δ and
τ. Figure 9 shows which types of stable equilibria exist for diﬀerent combinations of values
of δ and τ.For weak externalities, R&D never becomes concentrated and the only type of
equilibrium that exists is one in which R&D is dispersed. For stronger externalities, there
are more possibilities. For high δ and low to moderate trade costs, there are two stable
equilibria where R&D concentrates in either country. For high δ and moderate to high
trade costs, R&D becomes concentrated in Foreign. Moreover, within a certain range of
parameter values where neither δ nor τ are too high, R&D either becomes spread out or
concentrated in the small country. As externalities become stronger, the range of trade
costs for which an equilibrium with a concentration of R&D in the small country can
a p p e a ri n c r e a s e s .T h em a i nc o n c l u s i o ne m e r g i n gf r o mt h i si st h a tt h ec o m b i n a t i o no fl o w
trade costs and large R&D externalities create the preconditions for when a concentration
of R&D activities in the small country becomes a stable equilibrium. Note, however, that
it is only when R&D externalities are neither too small nor too large that the equilibrium
in which R&D is concentrated in the small country is the only possible agglomerated
25equilibrium.
{Figure 9: Equilibrium regimes for diﬀerent values of δ and τ}
5.2.2 Welfare
The Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation of preferences implies that a higher degree of product
variation reduces the price index and the cost of attaining a given level of utility. Welfare
thus increases with the number of varieties produced. The price index is also aﬀected
by the level of trade costs; both directly and through the eﬀect on the share of imported
goods. Due to the eﬀect of the share of imports on the price index, the per capita
utility tends to be higher in the large country (except in the limiting case where trade is
completely costless). This eﬀect may be even stronger when there are R&D externalities
if R&D agglomerates in the small country, since the share of imports of high-tech goods
from the large country will then be even higher.








where Λ = µµ(1−µ)(1−µ)/(Sj+Lj). This expression shows that changes in welfare are due
to changes in the real return to skilled and unskilled labor. In order to assess the welfare
implications of ending up in an equilibrium with an agglomeration of R&D activities, we
ﬁrst analyze how the CES price index diﬀer in diﬀerent equilibria.
When there are R&D externalities, the degree of product variation will depend on
the location of R&D activities. Product variation tends to be larger when R&D is ag-
glomerated than when it is dispersed, since the former situation leads to larger R&D
externalities. It also tends to be larger when it is agglomerated in the large country than
when it is agglomerated in the small economy, the reason being that the R&D sector
tends to be larger in the economy with more skilled labor. The exception to this is when
the home-market eﬀect is strong, since the large demand for skilled labor for ﬁnal goods
production then tends to bid up the price of skilled labor, resulting in an R&D sector that
may be smaller than the one an equilibrium with R&D concentrated in the small country
would generate.
26Figure 10 shows the CES price index in the two countries when R&D externalities are
suﬃciently strong for agglomeration of R&D activities to occur even when trade costs are
high (δ =0 .03).A si sc l e a rf r o mt h i sﬁgure, the equilibrium with R&D concentrated in
Home is associated with a relatively high price index in Home, especially as trade costs
become relatively high. Foreign has a lower price index, partly because it is larger and is
able to produce a larger share of the goods domestically, partly because all its resources
are used for ﬁnal goods production. The concentration of R&D activities in Home leads
to a relatively high return to skilled labor, which feeds into the price indices through the
eﬀect on prices of domestically produced varieties in Home and on prices of imported
varieties in Foreign.31 Since the prices of domestically produced varieties tend to have a
relatively high weight in the CES price index, especially for high trade costs, this may also
contribute to the diﬀerence in the price indices of Home and Foreign. In the equilibrium
with R&D concentrated in Foreign, Home still has a higher price index than Foreign, but
the diﬀerence is much smaller. Home now uses all its resources for domestic ﬁnal goods
production, while it is Foreign that devote part of its resources to R&D. Moreover, the
return to skilled labor now tends to be lower in Home than in Foreign.
{Figure 10: Price indices in diﬀerent equilibria (δ =0 .03).}
The concentration of R&D activities in one country frees up resources for high-tech
production in the other country, thereby leading to a relatively low import share and
lower consumer prices. The country that carries out all the R&D activities, on the other
hand, suﬀers from being able to produce less domestic varieties of the high-tech good,
thereby having a relatively high import share and high consumer prices. Hence, being the
host of an agglomeration of R&D activities has a negative eﬀect on the price level, and
will therefore lead to a lower real return to unskilled labor. However, it seems evident
that skilled labor potentially might beneﬁt from having a concentration of R&D activities,
since it will increase the demand for skilled labor and put upward pressure on the return
31With an agglomeration of R&D activities in Home, the return to skilled labor has to be higher in
Home than in Foreign with free trade. There is co-existence of national ﬁrms in Home and multinational
ﬁrms with R&D activities in Home. Since the ﬁxed costs for conducting R&D are higher for the multina-
tional ﬁrms than for the national ﬁrms (because of the separation cost ρm), the operating proﬁts of the
multinationals must also be higher in order for the zero proﬁt conditions for both types of ﬁrms to be
satisﬁed. This requires that the return to skilled labor in Foreign is lower than in Home. In autarky, it
also seems likely that the return to skilled labor will be higher in the country hosting an agglomeration
of R&D activities. However, for intermediate trade costs, because of the eﬀect on the demand for skilled
labor of the home-market eﬀect, the return to skilled labor may be higher in Foreign.
27to skilled labor.
Figure 11 shows the real return to skilled labor in the case corresponding to Figure
10, i.e. δ =0 .03.F o ra l ll e v e l so fτ i nb e t w e e nt h ef r e et r a d el e v e la n dt h el e v e la tw h i c h
an equilibrium with R&D concentrated in Home is no longer feasible, the real return to
skilled labor is higher in a country if that country is the host of an agglomeration of R&D
activities. For both countries, the diﬀerence is especially large for relatively high trade
costs, indicating that the higher price index when hosting an agglomeration is more than
compensated for by the higher return to skilled labor.
{Figure 11: The real return to skilled labor in diﬀerent equilibria (δ =0 .03)}
In the equilibrium with an agglomeration of R&D activities in Home, the real return
to skilled labor is higher in Foreign than in Home for intermediate trade costs, whereas
it is higher in Home than in Foreign for low and high trade costs. This again reﬂects
the impact of the home-market eﬀect, which tends to increase the return to skilled labor
through its eﬀect on demand for skilled labor in ﬁnal goods production, and to lower the
price index through its eﬀect on the share of domestically produced varieties.
From this analysis, which shows the outcome in what we believe is an interesting
and relevant case, we thus conclude that while skilled labor may beneﬁtf r o mh a v i n ga n
agglomeration of R&D activities, unskilled labor loses because it tends to make ﬁnal goods
more expensive. If unskilled labor receive a relatively high weight in overall welfare, it is
possible that the overall welfare eﬀect of hosting an R&D agglomeration is negative. This
welfare loss would occur even though the externality associated with R&D activities has
been assumed to be purely national in scope in the sense of one ﬁrm’s R&D activities only
aﬀecting other ﬁrms with R&D located in the same country. It is the interaction with the
home-market eﬀect that generates this result. Since there are two activities generating
externalities at the same time as they are competing for resources, the outcome in terms
of welfare depends on the relative strength of the welfare improving eﬀects generated by
the two types of externalities. Part of the beneﬁt from R&D spillovers is global since they
generate increased product variety, beneﬁtting both countries. The eﬀect that is purely
national is to raise wages of skilled labor in the country where R&D concentrates. This
then has to be weighed against the eﬀect on consumer prices stemming from producing a
smaller share of the high-tech products domestically.
285.2.3 Relative Size
T h er e l a t i v es i z eo fc o u n t r i e sm a ya ﬀect the results obtained above. As already mentioned,
the strength of the home-market eﬀe c tw i l ld e p e n do nt h er e l a t i v es i z eo fc o u n t r i e s .A tt h e
same time, whether R&D can become concentrated in the smaller country will depend on
whether the supply of skilled labor is suﬃciently large to support the entire R&D sector.
In order to analyze how the location pattern is aﬀected by changes in relative size,
we solve the model by varying Home’s share of a ﬁxed total supply of S and L and
keeping the level of trade costs and externalities constant. Figure 12 shows the case
with a strong home-market eﬀect (τ =1 .2) and moderate externalities (δ =0 .01). We
ﬁnd the same type of equilibria as shown in Figure 6. Within an interval where Home’s
share of overall resources is between around 0.2 and 0.4, there are three equilibria: one
in which the share of R&D activities is equal to relative country size, one in which R&D
tends to concentrate in the smaller country, and one (unstable) in which R&D activities
are spread out disproportionately between the countries. When Home’s share of overall
resources is lower than 0.2, we ﬁnd that the only stable equilibrium is the ﬁrst one; the
one in which the share of R&D activities corresponds to relative country size. Within this
interval, Home is not suﬃciently large to host all R&D activities and therefore, there will
not be a concentration of R&D activities, although there are incentives to locate R&D
in the smaller country. When Home’s share of overall resources is higher than 0.4, we
ﬁnd an additional unstable equilibrium in which Home’s share of R&D activities is small.
Throughout the range in which Home’s relative size is above 0.2, an equilibrium with R&D
concentrated in Home is a stable equilibrium. Thus, in order for such an equilibrium to
be possible, Home cannot be too small in relation to the rest of the world.
{Figure 12: Relative country size and equilibria with moderate externalities}
5.3 Discussion
The analysis in this paper shows that, in a model with completely localized R&D spillovers
and a home-market eﬀect, an equilibrium with a concentration of R&D activities in the
smaller region is stable for moderate to strong R&D spillovers and low to moderate levels
of trade costs. Under these circumstances, hosting an agglomeration of R&D externalities
will beneﬁt skilled labor, being the factor used in both R&D activities and high-tech
29production, but will be to the detriment of unskilled labor, being the factor used in
high-tech production and the rest of the economy.
There are several objections one could make about the realism about the setting
in which the analysis has been carried out. To begin with, R&D spillovers might not
primarily aﬀect the productivity in the innovation sector, as it has been assumed here,
but instead primarily the productivity in high-tech production. If this were the case, it
would create incentives for ﬁrms to locate high-tech production in the same place as R&D
takes place (similarly if the spillovers for some reason would go in the other direction;
from high-tech production to R&D). This could potentially be another explanation for
the observed tendency for co-location of high-tech production and R&D activities, in
addition to the presence of technology transfer costs within ﬁrms. However, the notion of
pure knowledge spillovers are probably best captured as a productivity eﬀect within the
knowledge creation sector itself, rather than a productivity eﬀect across sectors.
Another potential objection to the analysis is the assumption of purely national R&D
spillovers. The existing research points to substantial spillovers across national borders,
even if these spillovers seem to taper oﬀwith geographical distance (e.g. Keller, 2002). The
main justiﬁcation for focusing on purely national spillovers is that the eﬀect of making
them less national in this case is straightforward; it simply weakens the incentives for
concentration of R&D activities.
Since the location outcomes are, to a large extent, aﬀected by diﬀerentials in the
return to skilled labor, it would seem natural to consider how the possibility of skilled
labor to migrate across countries would aﬀect the outcome. The analysis of the real return
to skilled labor in diﬀerent types of equilibria in Figure 11 suggests that incentives for
skilled labor to migrate to the country hosting the agglomeration of R&D do indeed arise.
Interestingly enough, these incentives are small for certain intermediate levels of trade
costs in the equilibrium in which R&D agglomerates in the small country. The relatively
strong-home market eﬀects then leads to a real return to skilled labor in the large country
t h a ti sr o u g h l yt h es a m ea si nt h es m a l lc o u n t r y .T h ef a c tt h a tt h et w oc u r v e sc r o s s( n o t
only once, but twice) also suggests that market integration in the form of a reduction of
trade costs would lead to very diﬀerent migration incentives depending on the level from
which the reduction took place. To analyze this possibility explicitly is, however, beyond
the scope of this paper.
While our analysis primarily deals with the geographical separation of innovation and
production, it may also be applied to address the recent phenomenon of outsourcing of
30skill-intensive activities such as software programming from Europe and the US to low-
wage countries. Much like R&D, such activities are characterized by being upstream in
relation to production of the ﬁnal output and involving only small transportation costs.
In the context of our model, outsourcing of such activities would arise in order for the
ﬁrms to take advantage of cheap skilled labor in countries that are "small" in the sense
that they only contribute to a small share of the overall demand for the ﬁnal product.
As in the case analyzed here, we would expect that while skilled labor might lose from
the reduction in the demand for skilled labor, unskilled labor is likely to gain from lower
consumer prices. Consumer prices will be lower not only because there is a reduction in
production costs which is passed on to consumers, but also because the consumers end
up having better access to ﬁnal products, as they are supplied in closer proximity to the
consumers.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has analyzed location choice by ﬁrms operating in a high-tech sector on the
assumption that there are two sources of agglomeration economies: knowledge spillovers
from R&D activities and a home-market eﬀect based on the combination of scale economies
and trade costs. These two sources of agglomeration economies aﬀect the choice of locat-
ing R&D diﬀerently from the choice of locating high-tech production. The home-market
eﬀect creates incentives for high-tech ﬁrms to concentrate production in the larger econ-
omy, while the technological externality creates incentives for ﬁrms to locate R&D labs in
proximity to other R&D labs. Because skilled labor is assumed to be used in both produc-
tion and R&D, the tendency for production activities to concentrate in the large country,
thereby putting upward pressure on the return to skilled labor, implies that there may
be advantages associated with locating R&D in the small economy. When trade costs are
such that the home-market eﬀect is particularly strong, while the technological externality
is not too weak and not too strong, we get multiple equilibria: in one equilibrium, R&D
activities are completely concentrated in the smaller economy and in another, they are
spread out between countries. With stronger R&D spillovers, R&D becomes concentrated
in either country for low to intermediate trade costs, while it becomes concentrated in the
large country for high trade costs.
We also compare welfare in an equilibrium with R&D concentrated in the small country
with welfare in an equilibrium with R&D concentrated in the large country. Hosting an
31agglomeration of R&D activities leads to a higher price index than if R&D activities are
concentrated in the other country. In the former case, there is less resources available for
ﬁnal goods production compared to the latter. Because the consumer price index increases
with the share of imported products, this implies that the price index tends to be higher.
At the same time, hosting an agglomeration of R&D activities leads to a higher return
to skilled labor than if R&D activities are concentrated in the other country. The latter
eﬀect may be suﬃciently strong to lead to a higher real return to skilled labor, implying
that while unskilled labor loses from hosting an agglomeration of R&D activities, skilled
labor gains.
We started out with the observation that market size seems to have a diﬀerential
impact on the location of high-tech production and R&D activities in Europe. In our
model, an outcome where the attraction of high-tech production to a large economy
leads to a "crowding out" of R&D activities arises for certain parameter values; more
speciﬁcally, for relatively small R&D spillovers and intermediate trade costs. Whether
this is in fact an accurate description of R&D spillovers and trade costs in Europe, we
do not know, but it is diﬃcult to refrain from using the analysis to speculate about the
eﬀect of a further reduction of trade costs within Europe. According to the analysis
presented, a reduction in trade costs from an intermediate level would tend to reduce the
advantage of the small country in specializing in R&D activities, leading to either a more
dispersed outcome in terms of the location of R&D or, for higher R&D externalities, to
the possibility of an agglomeration in either country, perhaps making historical factors
decisive for the outcome. The reduction in trade costs would tend to lower consumer
prices, thereby having a positive eﬀect of real income. Still, skilled labor in the small
country would potentially lose, because of a possible reduction in demand for this factor.
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36Table 1: Results from ﬁxed-eﬀect regressions.
Dep var: HTexp Dep var: R&D
Fixed eﬀects IV-Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects IV-Fixed eﬀects
Coef. Elast. Coef. Elast. Coef. Elast. Coef. Elast.
MP 3.3×10−6 2.39 5.3×10−6 3.76 -6.3×10−6 -3.50 -7.1×10−6 -3.90
(3.83) (3.82) (5.86) (5.85) (-4.32) (-4.31) (-3.82) (-3.81)
Skill 0.215 0.145 0.230 0.149 -0.157 -0.081 -0.314 -0.162
(1.54) (1.54) (1.92) (1.92) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.92) (-0.92)
R&D 0.414 0.54 0.358 0.44 - -
(6.88) (6.88) (2.41) (2.41)
HTexp - - 1.278 0.976 1.774 1.36
(6.88) (6.83) (2.60) (2.60)
Constant -33.68 -54.71 88.63 78.26
(-3.36) (-5.67) (4.64) (4.46)
R2 0.80 0.83 0.68 0.63
Number of
observations
57 (16 groups) 66 (16 groups)
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics (z-statistics for IV-estimations). Time dummies are included.
Elasticities are evaluated at the mean of the independent variable. The value of R2 is related to the within
variation. As instrument for R&D we use the number of researchers in higher education as a share of the
population, R&D expenditures in higher education as share of GDP and GDP per capita and as instrument for
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Figure 1: R&D expenditures per capita and the share of high-tech exports in total
manufacturing exports 2000. [Note: The R&D ﬁgures are from 1999 for Denmark, Greece, Ireland,
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Figure 12: Relative country size and equilibria with moderate externalities.
43A Appendix
Derivation of equilibrium condition (14)
Assume that both countries produce Y so that wLj = wLk =1and only national ﬁrms
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The equilibrium price of a diﬀerentiated good is given by the ﬁrst-order condition for





























Setting proﬁts to zero yields:
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Solving for Xjj + τXjk gives us:
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As u ﬃcient condition for this expression to be positive is Sj
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α(σ − 1)), which holds according to (14).
Derivation of equilibrium condition (15)
Assume once more that both countries produce Y so that wLj = wLk =1and that only
national ﬁrms are operating. The condition that supply equals demand for a diﬀerentiated
good produced in country j is given by:















Substituting pj in (28) for the equilibrium price in (20) gives us:

















which can be rewritten as:



















Substituting the left-hand side of (30) for Xjj+τXjk given by the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n
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Using the expression for the equilibrium price in (20), we get the following expression























Noting that Ej is given by wSjSj + Lj and using the expression for the CES price index























































































k . This expression is not very
informative about the nature of the relationship between wSj and nn
j as goods market
clearing prevail. However, it shows that for low δ (implying a positive value of the numer-
ator), we would expect a positive relationship for high nn
j, whereas the relationship might
be negative for low values of nn
j. This potential non-monotonicity indicates the possibility
of multiple equilibria.
46Deriving condition for restricting the level of δ















In order for aggregate demand to increase with the number of R&D labs, the eﬀect of









































k (ρm − 1))
≤ 1. (42)
In the absence of any multinational ﬁrms (nm
k =0 ), a suﬃcient condition for aggregate
demand to increase with R&D is δ<1. However, in the presence of multinational ﬁrms,
the condition becomes more restrictive.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MP 66 1.25×107 4260797 6006190 2.20×107
Skill 66 11.667 4.390 4.000 25.000
R&D 66 22.642 12.972 1.625 63.703
HTexp 66 17.312 10.876 3.800 46.900
RHE 57 0.840 0.317 0.379 2.013
GDPcap 66 19891.36 3430.59 12307.47 26607.16
HERD 66 0.386 0.130 0.170 0.810
Trade 66 70.698 32.547 36.034 163.568
Note: Data for Skill in 1990 is from 1989. RHE is the number of full-
time equivalent researchers in higher education per 1000 population, GDPcap
GDP per capita, HERD R&D expenditures in higher eduction as a share of
GDP and Tradeforeign trade as a share of GDP.
Table 3: Correlation Table
MP Skill R&DH T e x pR H EG D P c a pH E R D T r a d e
MP 1.000
Skill 0.384 1.000
R&D 0.430 0.267 1.000
HTexp 0.240 0.212 0.240 1.000
RHE 0.665 0.370 0.665 0.018 1.000
GDPcap 0.739 0.465 0.739 0.184 0.482 1.000
HERD 0.798 0.468 0.798 0.077 0.639 0.639 1.000
Trade 0.225 0.234 0.080 0.630 0.073 0.191 0.187 1.000
Note: The sample consist of 57 observations. RHE is the number of full-time equivalent re-
searchers in higher education per 1000 population, GDPcap GDP per capita, HERD R&D
expenditure in higher eduction as a share of GDP and Tradeforeign trade as a share of GDP.
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